
THE COVID-19 HOAX AS AN ISLAMIC IDENTITY POLITICAL MOVEMENT: FRAMING ANALYSIS

Ari sulistyanto¹, Saeful Mujab²

Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta, Indonesia^{1,2}

ari.sulistyanto@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id¹, saeful.mujab@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id²

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ABSTRACT

The spread of hoaxes is associated with individuals or groups who secretly plan to achieve certain goals. The spread of hoaxes in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic becomes interesting when hoaxes become a medium for carrying out political movements. The purpose of this study is to uncover hoaxes as an Islamic identity political movement as a means of raising opinions and support. Framing analysis is an approach to analyze hoaxes as a political movement. The results of the study found that China was described as a source of problems from the cause of Covid-19, carrying out Islamic law as an antidote in overcoming Covid-19. This research has implications for mapping the identity politics movement through hoaxes.

Keyword: Hoax, Framing, Political Movement, Identity, Covid-19.

Corresponding Author: Ari sulistyanto
E-mail: ari.sulistyanto@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id



INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 in Indonesia contributed to spreading information that was categorized as a hoax on social media. Based on the records of the Ministry of Information, there are 785 hoax news on Facebook, 10 news on Instagram, 6 cases on Youtube, and 324 on Twitter (Aziz, 2020). This hoax issue is encountered in various cases. For example, hoaxes about the scenario of the economic crisis in Indonesia, information on drugs to prevent the corona virus, about how to prevent the corona virus, how to transmit the corona virus, about several heads of state/citizens who repented due to this virus, even for free. Internet packages. Interestingly, based on the examination carried out by the Police of the perpetrators of hoaxes, they explained several of the motives of the perpetrators, among others, for fun and dissatisfaction with the government (Halim, 2020).

In the digital era, hoaxes have become part of the political game, by manipulating information with the aim of attacking individuals or institutions (Yusuf, 2019). Another characteristic is supported by the habits of the Indonesian people who are not used to recording and storing data, so they often talk without data. (Miftah, 2019) On the other hand, Indonesians prefer to discuss aspects related to violence, sensuality, drama, intrigue, and mysteries that often color political activity, so it is not surprising that hoaxes often occur on political themes (Mulyana, 2017). In Indonesia, identity politics is more related to issues of ethnicity, religion, ideology, and local interests which are generally represented by the elite with their respective articulations, and what stands out

is the use of Islam as a "cloak" to highlight identity politics (A.S. Maarif, 2012) Identity politics is the participation of several individuals in politics by using the label or name of a particular social group. In practice, identity politics is a commodification of the periphery, in the midst of an established plurality order.

In Indonesia, religion has many identities that it represents, ranging from personal identity, ethnic identity, political identity, and national identity (Colbran, 2010). The real form and practice of starting the commodification of religion-based identity politics was during the election for the Governor of DKI Jakarta. However, after the election of the regional head of DKI Jakarta, "identity politics" did not subside, instead it continued to spread and spread, starting from the criminalization of kiai with racial differences, economic inequality, the change of president, and even expanded with the issue of changing the state administration system by emphasizing the concept of "caliphate". In its movement, identity politics was institutionalized by forming the 212 Alumni Association (PA 212) with the label Defending Islam Action with mass mobilization of action. The political configuration with an emphasis on identity politics has given rise to a political dichotomy in the form of binary opposition, such as "God's party with Satan's party". Allah's Party is a coalition of Islamic groups opposing the satanic party that is said to be a supporter of the ruling government. Other forms, such as the "Axis of Medina (Islamic coalition) with the axis of Beijing (coalition of government). Even using animal names, Islamic groups have labeled the ruling coalition supporting the government as "tadpoles", which are described as stupid animals. In contrast, the government coalition calls the groups Islam "Kampret" as a nocturnal animal known to steal.

In the literature review, not many studies have addressed the relationship between identity politics and social movements. Generally, the themes presented are conceptual in nature, rarely discussing those based on field research. Research that explains the relationship between identity politics and social movements, such as collective identities united by the same feelings, values, and views will be able to form social movements (Fominaya, 2010). (Diani, 2017) writing which discusses the role of networks in social movements. This is a little closer to the theme of this research, as was done by W. Bennet who researched the actions of social movements mediated by digital media networks (Bennett, 2012).

Research on social media and moral movements raises cases of KPK supporters who carried out moral movements by protesting the handling of corruption by the police (Sulistyanto, 2017). In a conceptual understanding, identity politics is the political mobilization of a group to achieve recognition and reparation for historical oppression by affirming group identity (Jungherr, 2016). Identity politics is the self-affirmation of a group that distinguishes it from other groups, with the aim of gaining recognition or power. There are several studies that focus on the identity politics movement carried out by transnational Islamic groups. For example, identity politics is a radical movement dressed in Islam (A.S. Maarif, 2012). Another study sees identity politics as an effort to restore identity and social movements to distinguish multiple identities. Action 212 and reunion 212 as a phenomenon of labeling Indonesian identity politics that continues to roll is not static and takes on a role in Indonesian political governance (Susilowati et al., 2019). Likewise, mass mobilization in the 412 and 212 actions and the 212 reunion, is a religious capitalization that emphasizes religious identity, which is referred to as post-truth political reality. By using ethnic and religious sentiments,

this movement politicizes religion based on populist discourse with the argument of distorted information to revive religious legitimacy in the context of political interests (Kurniawan, 2020).

Research on the spread of hoaxes as an Islamic identity political movement in Indonesia has not been widely carried out. The political movement requires consistency in mobilizing to be able to realize its goals with various movement methods. The spread of hoaxes is one way of the movement to gather opinion and support. Therefore, this study aims to reveal how communication in the form of hoaxes is carried out to realize the goals and how the dynamics of communication spread of hoaxes during the covid pandemic. Through this research, it can be seen that hoax communication is a political movement carried out as an identity politics movement. With the framing carried out in the spread of hoaxes, on the one hand, the advantages and themes of Covid hoaxes can be known, so that the direction of political ideas developed in the spread of Covid 19 hoaxes can be known during the pandemic. On the other hand, there is a strong communication effect from framing the spread of the Covid 19 hoax. In this case, the public will mark the framing of hoax information on social media. Thus, the response or acceptance of the community to the spread of the hoax can be known. Therefore, it is important to know the framing that is highlighted in the spread of hoaxes about Covid 19 on social media and its impact on society. By using the framing theory, this study aims to determine the framing of the covid 19 hoax on social media as an Islamic identity political movement. This will contribute to the mapping of radical Islamic political movements in Indonesia.

METHOD

Framing analysis is used as a method to understand hoaxes as a political movement. Framing theory, Benhard Snow & Snow focuses on how social movements construct, articulate, and disseminate their messages to recruit members and mobilize support (Woods, 2011). Framing has been defined as 'a conscious strategic effort by a group of people to form a shared (Diani, 2017) understanding of the world and themselves that legitimizes and motivates collective action' (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015) Processed. (Sotirovic, 2000) This is a kind of limitation that understands hoaxes as a political movement that regulates perceptions about social or political life. Frames identify targets for error, offer a desired vision of the world, and provide reasons to motivate collective action (Schultz, 2012).

Framing has been defined as 'a conscious strategic effort by a group of people to form a shared understanding of the world and themselves that legitimizes and motivates collective action' (Snow et al., 2019). Frames are interpretive schemas in which information is discovered and processed (Snow et al., 2018). This is a kind of template or filter that understands hoaxes as a political movement that regulates perceptions about social or political life. The frame identifies the target of error, offers a desired vision of the world, and provides reasons to motivate collective action (Vanhala, 2016). Therefore, there are three distinct categories of the framing process: diagnostic framing that focuses on problem definition; prognostic framing that offers the desired solution; and a motivational framework that encourages potential participants to join SMO (Gromov, 2015).

The frame of a movement can be a reflection of a collective identity, or it can help create a new identity. According to Roberta Garner, 'movement leadership frames discourse in such a way as to create an identity that will encourage individuals to support the movement and unite disparate support bases (Dalby, 2016). Frames give new meaning to people's lives. More importantly,

successful frames encourage solidarity and turn potential mobilizations into actual mobilizations. Prognostic framing describes how the problems identified in the diagnostic framework should be solved. The unknown outcomes and costs associated with collective action can be overcome only if actors are convinced (intuitively even before rationally) about the opportunity to mobilize and about the practicality and legitimacy of the action (Tversky, 2019). Although prognostic frameworks aim to offer a desired solution, they rarely offer a concrete plan. On the other hand, such a frame provides a utopian vision for society in a much better future.

Therefore, there are three distinct categories of the framing process: diagnostic framing that focuses on problem definition; prognostic framing that offers the desired solution; and motivational frameworks that encourage potential participants to join social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988). The frame of a movement can be a reflection of a collective identity, or it can help create a new identity. According to Roberta Garner, 'movement leadership frames discourse in such a way as to create an identity that will encourage individuals to support the movement and unite disparate support bases (Snow et al., 2018). Frames give new meaning to people's lives. More importantly, successful frames encourage solidarity and turn potential mobilizations into actual mobilizations.

To find out the theme in the framing, go through the NVivo 12 plus device. There are 200 words ranked as the basis for coding. The coding uses the principle of the grounded theory method and is carried out in three coding stages, namely open, axial and selective coding. (Vollstedt & Rezat, 2019) Open coding causes axial data coding which rearranges the data in a new way by making connections between categories. Selective coding is also applied by integrating various axial categories, namely between themes with different concepts compared to the existing literature. Framing analysis is used as a method to understand hoaxes as a political movement. Framing theory, Benhard Snow & Snow focuses on how social movements construct, articulate, and disseminate their messages to recruit members and mobilize support (Woods, 2011).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The role of social media is increasingly important for political and social activities in Mexico, especially Twitter has played an important role in influencing government decision-making and shaping the relationship between government, citizens, politicians and others (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2013). Hoaxes on social media can activate public trust (Park, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic has become the arena of the Islamic identity politics movement through hoaxes.

This article places more emphasis on framing analysis to understand how Islamic identity as a political movement communicates its goals and how Islamic identity is used as a medium to mobilize opinion and support for constituents and the wider audience. Since the first time the Covid virus attacked Wuhan, China, from a crisis communication perspective, it was the beginning to detect a crisis. Identifying potential crisis threats is part of the pre-crisis phase (Adkins, 2010). The Indonesian government itself has not yet established an emergency response in dealing with the spread of the covid 19 virus. However, on social media, various hoaxes regarding covid 19 have been spread, with various false and manipulative claims. There are various themes that emerge, one of which is strengthening Islamic identity.

An analytical framework to view this strengthening as a political movement, framing theory is used to understand how Islamic identity as a political movement communicates its goals and how

Islamic identity mobilizes opinion and support for its constituents and the wider audience. Diagnostic framing identifies some event or condition as problematic and in need of remediation, and thus pinpoints the culpable agent (Castillo-Manzano, 2013). As a result, he discovers what went wrong and why. Diagnostic framing usually involves constructing a frame of injustice, which is based on 'an interpretation of what happened that supports the conclusion that the system of authority violates the shared moral principles of the participants'.

In the pre-crisis period, the diagnostic framework for strengthening Islamic identity defined the Covid outbreak as predicted in the Qur'an, namely Iqra. They claim that Indonesian Kyai and Ulama have predicted the Covid outbreak because of the word "QO-RONA", because the Book of Iqra already mentions it. In addition, Chinese foreigners are considered guilty agents because they are carriers of the Covid virus, so they must be shunned. In this diagnostic frame, placing the Qur'an as a source of knowledge, while Chinese foreigners are the cause of the problem.

The prognostic framework describes how the problems identified in the diagnostic framework should be solved. In this frame, placing the Shari'a or procedures in Islam is a source to overcome the Covid 19 outbreak. For example, ablution can eliminate Covid. On the other hand, placing China as an object that follows Islamic procedures. Various hoax claims that describe China as a communist country that does not know God, have turned to a belief system taught by Islam. Hoax claims, such as, "Afraid of Corona, Chinese Residents Scramble for Al-Qur'an to be Learned", "Mosques in China Re-opened After China Was Hit by Corona Virus", Chinese President Announces Corona Virus Has Become an Epidemic and Asks Muslims to Pray, Wudhu Can Destroy the Corona Virus", "Chinese non-Muslims join in prayer for fear of contracting the Corona Virus", "Chinese people are busy saying the creed to avoid Corona Virus", Xi Jinping asked Muslims to pray for China because of the corona virus."

While diagnostic and prognostic frameworks play an important role in mobilizing support, they are not sufficient to encourage people to take action. Indeed, Bert Klandermans argues that identifying problems and offering solutions achieves consensus mobilization, i.e. mobilization of support for social movement goals (Van Dyke & Taylor, 2019). But consensus mobilization does not automatically lead to action mobilization. Motivational framing aims to encourage participation and generate the necessary incentives for action. Thus, potential proponents of collective action should anticipate that their involvement and association with social movements will help resolve problems.

When motivational frameworks are widely shared, opportunities for collective action increase substantially. To spread collective action, hoax claims that emerged were the covid virus which was intended to kill Uighurs, but leaked in Wuhan, China. The Uyghurs come from the descendants of the Turkestan clan who have long inhabited Central Asia and West Asia. As a minority in the northwestern region of the People's Republic of China, the existence of this tribe often gets negative stigma from the state. They are often labeled as a separatist group. The atmosphere became increasingly cloudy after massive demonstrations in 2009 that led to riots between the Uighur and Han ethnic groups in the province of Xinjiang. Over the next four decades, the strong control of Communist Party authorities in Xinjiang has minimized the potential for ethnic separatism in the region. But for most ethnic Uighurs, the hope and sentiment of having a state of their own has not completely faded.

The crisis response phase began when President Joko Widodo announced the formation of the Covid 19 Task Force (Kompas, 2020). This policy is a response to the findings of 2 confirmed Covid-19 people, as well as criticism from a number of groups who say the Indonesian government is slow

in dealing with Covid (Ihsanuddin, 2020). Since the first case was announced, Indonesia has taken various policy steps to address it. One of them is PSBB (Large-Scale Social Restrictions) and PPKM (Enforcement of Restrictions on Community Activities). As a result, various activities were restricted, and public facilities, including mosques and other places of worship, were closed to avoid crowds. With these restrictions, Hoaks stood out when criticizing the congregational prayer policy by implementing social distancing.

Hoax blames government policies as satanic. The hoax narrative is written "Not because of the corona covid-19 outbreak you are being played by the devil, you are deceived, with the corona virus. This is one of the most cruel slanders of the Dajjal at the end of time." This hoax narration gives the meaning of conspiracy related to the emergence of the covid outbreak called the devil-dajjal (Indozone, 2021). On the other hand, China is associated with the cause of the Covid pandemic. Hoax claims, such as Covid made in a Chinese military laboratory, frightened Chinese virologists who fled to the United States for fear of being killed for acknowledging Covid as an evil conspiracy. The covid virus as a conspiracy by citing Chinese virologists who fled to the United States out of fear. Likewise, goods-goods such as clothing or electronics originating from China have been exposed and become the cause of Covid transmission. In the crisis response phase, due to restrictions on mobilization both domestically and the entry of foreign nationals into Indonesia. Hoaxes spread on social media regarding the arrival of foreign workers can be seen in several airports in Indonesia. The entry of foreign workers from China during the Covid pandemic has indeed drawn controversy . Deputy Chairperson of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly, Jazilul Fawaid, asked the government to be firm in making policies. This, he said, was in response to the issue of the entry of Foreign Workers (TKA) from China in the midst of the Emergency Enforcement of Community Activity Restrictions (PPKM).

The indication is the release of dozens of foreign workers from China who entered Indonesia during Emergency PPKM (Indozone, 2020). Likewise, PKS through the Chairperson of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) DPP Mardani Ali Sera encouraged the government to be transparently open regarding the arrival of foreign nationals (WNA) to Indonesia in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic situation (Indozone, 2020). In this hoax, posts were spread about the arrival of Chinese foreign workers who entered Kasi Village, South Halmahera, Maluku using private boats. The post in the form of a video uploaded on social media Youtube related to the arrival of Chinese foreign workers at Soekarno Hatta Airport, followed by the narration, "The Facts of Dozens of Chinese Foreign Workers Entering Two Airports in Indonesia are Terrible". Another hoax narrative "What's up with the Indonesian people in a locked state." The hoax narrative wants to convey the message that it is necessary to be vigilant against the arrival of foreign workers from China. Because in another hoax post, it is described that Chinese foreign workers are disguised by the Chinese Army who wants to control Indonesia.

Emphasis on Islamic identity, criminalization of ulama, China as aggressor, and criticism of President Jokowi's government. In the crisis response, the display of Islamic identity can be seen in various posts with keywords, such as "prostrate, recite the Koran, convert to Islam to avoid Covid. By referring to countries known as secular countries, such as Italy, New Zealand, and China, which are considered atheist communist countries, they have changed their beliefs to become Muslims.

The protrusion of identity is also seen in the post, Covid is hindering the rise of Islam. The full narration was uploaded on Facebook, "The Enormity of Corona's Slander". Covid-19 is just slander that is used to hinder the rise of Muslims." The theme of the hoax is about the marginalization of scholars, several hoax posts with narratives, such as the subtle kidnapping of clerics by giving positive verdicts for Covid or rapid test equipment used to kill an ustadz. During the crisis response period, the government's policy to carry out tracing using rapid tests is to control the rate of Covid transmission. The dominant discourse on the COVID-19 vaccine policy, in the identity politics movement through hoaxes, is suspected to have ideological interests, such as the vaccine business or vaccine monopoly originating from one country. countries, so that the term "hammer and sickle vaccine" appears. On the other hand, some deconstructions are manipulative, such as the term "vaccine drama".

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the study, it can be concluded that hoaxes are an Islamic identity political movement with various manipulative hoax narratives that frame covid as an evil fabrication of conspiracy results. There are some limitations to this research. The ability to generalize the results to a wider population is limited due to the exploratory nature of the study. However, the main objective of this research is to obtain an overview of the critical narrative themes of opinion leaders regarding government policies regarding the Covid-19 vaccine which are rich in textual understanding rather than obtaining statistical insight on a number of variables. Therefore, for further research, more quantitative studies are proposed to validate these findings in order to draw conclusions for the wider community.

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